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BANKRUPTCY AND RECOVERY OF
TORT DAMAGES
GEORGE W. KUNEY*
The apprehension that bankruptcy will become a convenient expedient for
avoiding the successorship doctrine is not well founded. The adverse
consequences of bankruptcies involving displacement of management,
creditor control and liquidation hardly support the argument that [businesses]
will use bankruptcy to avoid their responsibilities . . .

-Don't

you believe it!2

Torts and bankruptcy go hand in hand, at least if the liability is large or
endemic enough. What happens when tort liability and bankruptcy intersect
may shock you. Asbestos presents only one of the myriad examples of mass
3
tort litigation interrupted by bankruptcy. Other examples include birth control
4 breast implants,' and plumbing products.'
devices,
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the James L. Clayton Center for
Entrepreneurial Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A., University of
California, Santa Cruz; J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law; M.B.A.,
University of San Diego. Prior to joining the faculty of The University of Tennessee, the
Author concentrated his practice on bankruptcy and insolvency matters nationwide before
withdrawing from Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP in December 2000. The Author
thanks Donna C. Looper for her analytic and editorial advice in connection with this Article and
Richard Kebrdle for his diligent research and drafting assistance regarding director and officer
liability insurance issues. Portions of the subject matter ofthis Article appear and are addressed
in greater detail, beyond the scope of tort damages, in George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting
Bankruptcy Code Section 36309 and Undermining the Chapter II Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J.
235 (2002) [hereinafter Kuney, Misinterpretations 1] and George W. Kuney, Further
Misinterpretation of Bankruptcy Code Section 363(): Elevating In Rem Interests and
Promoting the Use of Property Law to Bankruptcy-Proof Real Estate Developments, 76 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 289 (2002) [hereinafter Kuney, Misinterpretations II].
1. Rubinstein v. Alaska Pac. Consortium (In re New England Fish Co.), 19 B.R. 323,
329 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982).
2. Author.
3. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving
Roles ofAdministrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947 (discussing the range
of mass tort litigation).
4. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 89 B.R. 555, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 1988) (summarizing
events precipitating the Chapter 1Icase of the manufacturer of the "Dalkon Shield").
5. See, e.g., Dow Corning Corporation Chapter 11 Information, at
http://www.implantclaims.com (last visited Jan. 12, 2004) (providing general information
regarding Dow Coming silicone breast implants and ongoing bankruptcy proceedings).
6. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hoechst Celanese Corp. (In re U.S. Brass Corp.), 173 B.R.
1000, 1003 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) (summarizing events precipitating the Chapter 11 filing
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What brings these fields of law together are the plaintiffs' desire to recover
something after establishing liability and the defendants' desire to avoid
payment of tort claims by liquidating assets that can be used to generate future
cash flows. Furthermore, potential defendants may be able to block suits or
liability entirely, as a legal or practical matter, by use of bankruptcy as a
peremptory device before others are generally aware of the potential liability.
Tort and bankruptcy law collide in at least three key areas with which torts
attorneys should be familiar: (i) the distinctions that are drawn between
existing, yet contingent, claims and future claims-and the implications of
these distinctions;7 (ii) sales of assets free and clear of claims and
interests-with and without a plan of reorganization; 8 and (iii) the effect of a
company's addition of entity coverage to its directors' and officers' liability
policy on a judgment creditor's ability to recover on the policy when the
company files for relief under the Bankruptcy Code ("the Bankruptcy Code"
or "the Code").' This Article seeks to inform the reader on these issues and
to suggest how these bankruptcy principles impact upon recovery of tort
damages.
I. EXISTING CONTINGENT CLAIMS VERSUS FUTURE CLAIMS

In a Chapter II case,"0 confirmation of a plan of reorganization discharges
a debtor's liability for "any debt that arose before the date of such
confirmation" whether or not the claim is allowed or slated to receive any
distributions under the plan." Similarly, in a Chapter 7 case the discharge
order bars further pursuit or recovery of "all debts that arose before the date
of the order for relief' whether or not the claim in question receives any
distributions in the Chapter 7 case. 2 Therefore, understanding when a debt
arises is critical for torts attorneys; it determines whether the debt can be
discharged and rendered unenforceable through bankruptcy. Unfortunately,
the analysis in all but the simple case is not always clear.
As with most bankruptcy analyses, working through the effects of the
statute's definition sections is crucial. The word "debt"-what debtors are
discharged of through bankruptcy proceedings-is defined as "liability on a

of the manufacturer of polybutylene pipes).
7. See discussion infra Part I.
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. Chapters 7 and 11 are analyzed in this section of the Article because they are the
chapters under which business debtors are likely to seek protection. The analysis is largely the
same under Chapters 9, 12, and 13, where relief is provided for municipalities, family farmers,
and individuals with regular income; however, the analysis under those chapters is beyond the
scope of this Article.
1i.
II U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2000).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).
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4
claim," 3 and "the meanings of 'debt' and 'claim' [are] coextensive."' The
question then arises: What is a "claim"? The Code defines the term very
broadly as:

(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach or performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an
matured,
equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent,
5
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured."
In other words, a claim encompasses any liability or potential liability other
than one for a purely equitable remedy for which no substitute right to6
payment exists should the debtor avoid enforcement of the equitable remedy.
Tort liability generally meets this definition and is a type of claim under the
Code.
The next level of the analysis is to understand when a claim arises for
purposes of federal bankruptcy law. The answer is not found by looking to7
state law, as is the case with other bankruptcy-related property questions.'
Rather, bankruptcy law governs the determination of when a claim arises, and
"'not . . . the particular state or non Code federal law giving rise to the
claim."" 8

13.

11 U.S.C. § 101(12).

14. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558 (1990), quoted in Am.
Law Ctr. PC v. Stanley (In re Jastrem), 253 F.3d 438, 442 (9th Cir. 2001).

15.

11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

16. An example of a nonclaim would be the debtor's "liability" for nonperformance of
a mandatory injunction when ordering payment of damages for such nonperformance is not an
alternative. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 280-83 (1985). Nonclaim liabilities are rare.
17. See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 541 (a) (defining property of the estate); Butner v. United States,
440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979). The Butner Court noted:
Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a
bankrupt's estate to state law.
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest
requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed
differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Id. (footnote omitted). Beyond the question of when a claim "arises" is the issue of what claims
are non-dischargeable, which generally features fraudulent or other intentional conduct. See
11 U.S.C. § 727 (listing non-dischargeable claims). That issue is fairly well defined and is
beyond the scope of this Article.
18. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925, 930 n.5 (9th Cir.
1993) (quoting Arlene Elgart Mirsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy and
EnvironmentalLaws, 46 Bus. LAW 623,651 (1991)); see Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization
(In re Cool Fuel, Inc.), 210 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Even when a cause of action is
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Courts have employed four tests for determining whether a claim arose
preconfirmation or pre-petition. Although three of these tests are generally
accepted, one has been largely relegated to the dust bin. The "debtor's
conduct test" provides that a claim "arises upon the occurrence of the debtor's
[pre-petition] conduct that ultimately gave rise to the subsequent cause of
action."' 9 This test is the most broad and sweeping of the four. All that must
occur is the conclusion of the debtor's side of the test. In other words, if the
debtor has "pulled the trigger," the claim has arisen; it is not important
whether the tort victim has suffered the injury that will result, or, if the injury
has been suffered, whether she even knows that she has been damaged. When
discussing discharge of claims, some view this test as raising due process
problems. How can the involuntary creditors (tort victims) receive notice and
have an opportunity to be heard if they cannot be identified because they have
not yet been, and may never be, injured? In certain cases, data may exist to
allow some tort victims overly broad notice-all asbestos workers and all
asbestos customers of a particular company for example. However, little
exists in the way of a practical solution in the products liability context for the
problem of the subsequent purchaser (i.e., the person who purchases the
defective product from the original purchaser and is then injured by that
product after the manufacturer's bankruptcy case has commenced or closed).
Lack of a practical solution to this problem led to development of both the
"relationship" and the "fair contemplation" tests to define when a claim arises.
The "'relationship' or 'Piper' test.., requires either a pre-petition or preconfirmation relationship, 'such as a contact . . .between the debtor's
pre-petition conduct and the claimant." 0 Under the "fair contemplation" test,
a claim arises pre-petition if it is "'based on pre-petition conduct [and] can be
fairly contemplated by the parties at the time of [d]ebtors' bankruptcy."' 2
When a claim is based on pre-petition tortious conduct that arises out of a prepetition relationship between the claimant and the debtor, courts have
recognized that the debtor conduct, relationship, and fair contemplation tests
are all satisfied.22 Under these circumstances, due process concerns are at least
ameliorated, if not solved. If a relationship exists or if the fair contemplation
test is met (one is hard pressed to imagine a case where one of these tests
would be met and the other would not), potential creditors may be identified

based on state law, 'the question of when a [claim] arises under the bankruptcy code is
governed by federal law."' (alteration in original) (quoting Siegel v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage
Corp., 143 F.3d 525, 532 (9th Cir. 1998))).
19. Hexcel Corp. v. Stepan Co. (In re Hexel Corp.), 239 B.R. 564,568 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
20. Id. at 567 (quoting Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Estate
of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re Piper Aircraft, Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11 th Cir. 1995)).
21. Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 (quoting In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 409 (N.D.
Tex. 1992)).
22. See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Alaska Pac. Consortium (In re New England Fish Co.), 19
B.R. 323, 329 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982).
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from available lists of employees, current and past customers, and vendors,
which can be used as a starting point for providing notice. Further, the
traditional means of providing actual, directed notice (such as by mail) may
be supplemented through constructive notice by publication in papers of
record in areas suggested by the otherwise available lists of persons exposed
to the product (e.g., employees, customers, and vendors). Of course, in these
circumstances, subsequent purchasers that may someday hold future claims are
not included in the definition of "claim"; therefore, their claims are not
discharged and cannot be stripped from the debtor's assets-if they attach to
those assets-under the Bankruptcy Code's sale or vesting free-and-clear
powers.2 3
A fourth test, the "state-law accrual" or "right to payment" test, "provides'
24
that a claim only 'arises' once the claimant has the right to obtain payment."
;25
Co.
Frenville
M.
v.
Bienes
&
Avellino
in
test
The Third Circuit applied this
however, most courts have criticized and rejected it as inconsistent with the
broad definition of "claim" in § 101 (5).26
What does this mean for the torts attorney? Because of the Code's broad
definition of claim, the near universal criticism of the state-law accrual test,
and the concomitant adoption of the debtor's conduct, relationship, and fair
contemplation tests, most tort liability other than so-called "future claims" will
be classified as claims or debts that can be eliminated through the bankruptcy
discharge.
Where the injury resulting from the tort is complete, employing this
analysis provides little difficulty, even if its results are disappointing for both
the tort victim and counsel. In such a case, the tort liability will be classified
as a general unsecured claim and treated ratably with other, similarly situated
creditors. 7

23.
24.

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(f), 1141(b)-(c)(2000).
Hexcel, 239 B.R. at 569 n.5 (citing Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M.

Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984)).
25. 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984).
26. See Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 ("Frenville's 'right of payment' theory is 'widely
criticized' outside the Third Circuit, at least in part because it would appear to excise
'contingent' and 'unmatured' claims from § 101(5)(A)'s list." (citation omitted)); see, e.g., Am.
Law Ctr. PC v. Stanley (In re Jastrem), 253 F.3d 438, 442 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting language
from Jensen in support of its criticism of the right to payment test); see also Cool Fuel, Inc. v.
Bd. of Equalization (In re Cool Fuel, Inc.), 210 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2000) ("It is wellestablished that a claim is ripe as an allowable claim in a bankruptcy proceeding even if it is a
cause of action that has not yet accrued.").
27. Priority in bankruptcy is everything to creditors. The priority scheme, in descending
order, may be summarized as follows:
(1) Secured Creditors (up to the value of their collateral less any permissible surcharges),
see I1 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 507, 726(a)(1);
(2) Administrative Priority Unsecured Creditors (largely postpetition debtors and the fees
and expenses of insolvency professionals involved in the case as allowed by the bankruptcy
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Where, however, the injury resulting from the tort is not complete-as in
the case of future claims-difficulties exist. These situations arise when the
debtor has completed its tortious conduct, and the tort victim has not yet
sustained damage or discovered that she has sustained damage. The most
common example, as noted above, is products liability. The law in this area
is unsettled and is best considered on a case-by-case basis in which the
particular facts may indicate whether a future claims representative, a
channeling injunction, or some other mechanism is appropriate, or whether the
claims must remain unaddressed and undischarged.
29 view,"
Under
dominant
future successor
is not
an inthe
remapparently
claim or interest.
Rather, a
successor
liability liability
is based claim
more

court), see §§ 503, 507, 726(a)(1);
(3) Other Priority Creditors (including workers' claims (subject to dollar limitations),
special interest group claims (such as those of grain farmers, fishermen, consumers that made
prepayments or deposits, and spouses for alimony, maintenance, or support), certain taxes and
duties, and FDIC claims), see §§ 507(a), 726(a)(1);
(4) General Unsecured Creditors (including those holding tortjudgments or tort claims that
arose pre-petition under the pertinent test), see § 726(a)(2);
(5) Subordinated Debt (subordinated either by contract or by operation of law or court
order), see § 726(a)(3)-(4); and
(6) Equity Holder Interests (stock, partnership interests, limited liability company
membership interests, etc.), see § 726(a)(6).
It is important for plaintiffs' lawyers to note how low general unsecured debt falls on the
priority ladder and the low distributions that generally are made on account of that debt.
28. An alternative theory, relying upon property law concepts, exists and has been
discussed in academic and bankruptcy reform circles. See J. Maxwell Tucker, The Clash of
Successor Liability Principles, Reorganization Law, and the Just Demand that Relief Be
Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 34 n. 177 (1995), citing
David Gray Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of
Intertemporal CreditorPriorities Created by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and
Toxic- Waste Cleanup, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 131, 145-49 (1987). However, this
theory has not met with much acceptance in case law, as only one reported opinion has
apparently mentioned it. See Conway v. White Trucks, 692 F. Supp. 442, 455 n.9 (M.D. Pa.
1988) (summarizing Professor Carlson's position to be "that [§ 363(0(5)] should be read to
permit the foreclosure of future claimants from proceeding against successor corporations where
a fund is created to which the future Plaintiffs' ratable share of cash proceeds would be paid").
Under this "property" approach to successor liability, the bankruptcy court can use § 363(f) to
scrape successor liability claims off the debtor's property like barnacles from the hull of a
ship-at least under certain conditions, such as when a trust is created from the proceeds of sale.
29. Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 920
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) ("[W]hile successor liability may give a party an alternative entity
from whom to recover, the doctrine does not convert the claim into an in rem action running
against the property being sold."), vacated by 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998); In re
Correct Mfg. Corp., 167 B.R. 458, 460 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that unless the Piper
Aircraft "prepetition relationship" test is met, there is "no claim against the estate under the
definition of claim codified in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)").
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3
on tort or conduct notions, such that no claim arises until the tort occurs.
Thus, in the case of future products liability claims, there is no claim to sell
free and clear of at the time of the sale. The claim arises later, in the hands of
3
the successor; therefore, a previous § 363(0 order could not have affected it.

30. See Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The products-liability tort
occurs when the defect in the design or manufacture of the product causes a harm, and [that did
not] happen to Denver until the defective pipes burst.").
31. Mooney Aircraft Corp. v. Foster (In re Mooney Aircraft, Inc.), 730 F.2d 367,375 (5th
Cir. 1984) ("The [plaintiffs] did not even have a claim at the time of the bankruptcy court's
order of sale. There was no property right to be deprived; by the same token, there was no
claim to be divested." (footnote omitted)), quoted in Am. Living Sys. v. Bonapfel (In re All
Am. of Ashburn, Inc.), 56 B.R. 186, 189 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986). Similarly, in rejecting an
argument that notice by publication was sufficient to bar tort victim postpetition claims based
on injuries arising prior to plan confirmation, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of Illinois stated:
[T]he argument implies that the uninjuredpersons who wish to protect themselves in event
of future injuries have the burden of monitoring national financial papers ... to read
notices about businesses they have no claims against because they are on notice of claim
bar dates affecting any future injuries caused by such companies. Franz Kafka would have
been able to accept such a legal principle in one of his stories; the Bankruptcy Code and
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution cannot.
1993).
Pettibone Corp. v. Payne (In re Pettibone Corp.), 151 B.R. 166, 172 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Cases addressing the issue routinely hold that claims are not barred or discharged when they
arise after a sale or confirmation order and are held by claimants that neither had a pre-order
relationship with the debtor nor received any meaningful notice of the proceedings. See Hexcel
Corp. v. Stepan Co. (In re Hexcel Corp.), 239 B.R. 564, 570 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that a
post-confirmation claim against the debtor for contribution in a toxic tort case was not
"reasonably contemplate[d]" by the parties preconfirmation and, thus, was not discharged via
the confirmed plan); Schwinn Cycling & Fitness Inc. v. Benonis, 217 B.R. 790, 795-96 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (concluding that a post-confirmation products liability claim was not discharged by
the confirmed plan and was not extinguished through the sale free and clear); see also Epstein
v. Official Comm. of Undersecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re Piper
Aircraft, Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11 th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that possible future products
liability claimants with no preconfirmation relationship with the debtor's product do not hold
claims under § 101(5) and cannot participate in the bankruptcy proceedings via an appointed
representative); W. Auto Supply Co. v. Savage Arms, Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.), 43 F.3d
714, 720 n.9 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that an order approving the sale of substantially all of the
debtor's assets under § 363 is "the functional equivalent" of an order confirming a plan of
reorganization); Kewanee Boiler Corp. v. Smith (In re Kewanee Boiler Corp.), 198 B.R. 519,
526, 540-41 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that a successor liability claim arising from the
post-confirmation explosion of a boiler manufactured by the debtor was not barred under
§ 524(a)(2)). This recognition that some successor liability claims have yet to arise is also
inconsistent with the notion that successor liability is an existing in rem interest at the time of
the sale.
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II. TRANSFERS OF ASSETS FREE AND CLEAR

The hallmark of much bankruptcy practice is the separation of assets from
liabilities.32 In Chapter 7, the trustee collects and liquidates the debtor's
nonexempt assets, then distributes the resulting proceeds to creditors and
parties in interest in order ofpriority. In a classic Chapter 11 case,33 the debtor
deploys its assets according to a business model provided for in the plan of
reorganization and described in the disclosure statement. The proceeds and
product of this deployment are used to make payments to various classes of
creditors and parties in interest as provided for in the plan. In each case, the
effect of bankruptcy is to stay creditors, collect the debtors' nonexempt assets,
and distribute the product or proceeds of the assets-whether operated,
hypothecated, or sold-to creditors under either the Chapter 7 priority scheme
or one detailed in a plan that meets the requirements of Chapter 11.
The process of separating assets and liabilities is fairly straightforward and
relatively inexpensive in the Chapter 7 context-not so in Chapter 11. The
road to a confirmed plan can be long, hard, and expensive; the Chapter 11
process provides myriad opportunities for creditors and other parties in interest
to seek relief from or against a debtor or to object to the debtor's proposals,34
operating decisions, business plans, and the plan of reorganization itself.
Nonetheless, the ability to separate assets from liabilities and retain control
over the assets or their proceeds is very alluring to potential debtor businesses
and those who control them. That is the promise of Chapter 11.
As a result of the high cost of realizing the benefits of Chapter 11 through
the classic plan-based reorganization, insolvency professionals have developed
and the courts have increasingly blessed the nonplan sale of a business in
Chapter 11 under 11 U.S.C. § 363. 3' Nonplan sales are accomplished through
motion practice, rather than the lengthy and expensive multistep plan

32. See generally Kuney, Misinterpretations I, supra note * (discussing separation
strategy); cf Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note * (discussing separation strategy in the
real estate context). See generally George W. Kuney, Let's Make it Official: Adding an
Explicit Pre-PlanSale Process as an Alternative Exit from Chapter 11, 40 Hous. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004) (on file with the Tennessee Law Review) (proposing a scheme for uniform
regulation of nonplan sales); George W. Kuney, Selling a Business in Bankruptcy Without a
Plan of Reorganization, 18 CAL. Bus. L. PRAC. 57 (2003) (discussing the rapid growth of
bankruptcy courts as a forum for the nonplan sale of business assets free and clear of liabilities).
33. A "classic Chapter 11 case," as the term is used here, denotes a case focused on
proposing and confirming a plan of reorganization. This type of case was the model for which
Chapter 11 was drafted, but the cost and delay attendant upon the process have made the
successful classic Chapter I1 case rare. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note *, at 242
n.30.
34. See id. (describing evolution ofthe Chapter 11 sale free-and-clear process in response
to the high cost and delay of reorganization by plan).
35. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note *, at 238-44 (describing the sale out-ofthe-ordinary-cause-of-business and free-and-clear sales processes).
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process.36 This process allows a debtor to sell its business to an entity that
pays for it with cash or other consideration,37 such as a promissory note
secured by the assets sold or some form of a participating contingent interest
in the business's future operation.3" Finally, through expansive interpretation
of § 363(0, the sale is made free and clear of claims and interests, cutting off
the rights of the debtor's creditors that would otherwise exist under state law,
including rights of recovery under the doctrine of successor liability. In re
Trans WorldAirlines,39 involving the Chapter 11 bankruptcy and § 363(0 sale
of former airline great Trans World Airlines (TWA) illustrates the effect that
this practice can have on plaintiffs and their counsel.
Before filing for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, TWA had been the
subject of two sets of claims involving the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC): the "Travel Voucher Program Claims" and the other
"EEOC Claims."4 Underlying the Travel Voucher Program Claims was a suit
filed in 1977-and later certified as a class action-by a female flight
attendant for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of l964.4' The suit was based upon TWA's practice of "placing female
flight attendants on [maternity] leave immediately upon becoming pregnant"
regardless of their individual ability to perform theirjob functions.42 The class
action was settled in exchange for system-wide travel vouchers that could be
used by the class members or their family at any time during the class
members' lifetime.43 The other EEOC Claims were not fully adjudicated or

36. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-29 (2000) (detailing the plan, disclosure statement, and
confirmation process).

37. See 11 U.S.C. § 363.
38. For example, in 2001, Enron Corporation conducted a § 363 sale of its energy trading
businesses-the heart of its business-to UBS Warburg entirely in exchange for a participating
contingent interest in future profits. See Alan Clendenning, Enron Power Trading
Division Buyer to Share Profits (Jan. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.boston.com/news/daily/14/enron_01 1402.htm.
39. 322 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2003).
40. Id. at 285.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. ld. In explaining why the voucher settlement-reached in 1995-was still relevant
some twenty-five or more years after suit was originally filed, the court stated that "[m]ost
flight attendants, as was their prerogative, elected to save the vouchers for long trips to be taken
after retirement when they had more time to travel and would receive more favorable tax
consequences for use of the vouchers." Id. Interestingly, this statement is not necessary for the
holding or the remainder of the opinion unless it is read as a justification for the court's action
in effectively denying the flight attendants the benefit of their prior bargain. If so, the
implication may be that the flight attendants involved had over eight years since the settlement
to use their vouchers and had, instead, made a greedy bet by deferring their use which, due to
the outcome of the case, they lost.
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settled and included claims for "various violations of several federal
employment discrimination statutes."
During TWA's bankruptcy case, substantially all of its operating assets
were sold to American Airlines' parent company, AMR, free and clear of "all
asserted or unasserted, known or unknown, employment related claims,
payroll taxes, employee contracts, employee seniority accrued while employed
with [TWA or its affiliates] and successorship liability accrued up to the date
of the closing of such sale."4' Further, the sale order enjoined anyone "from
taking any action against [AMR or its affiliates] including, without limitation,
[the AMR acquisition subsidiary], to recover any claim which such Person had
solely against [TWA or its affiliates]. 46
In considering whether the sale, conducted under § 363(f) of the
Bankruptcy Code, could bar claims, including both sets of EEOC claims, the
Third Circuit noted that the free-and-clear-of-interests process had been
narrowly interpreted to mean free and clear of in rem interests in the past, but
that the trend was toward "a more expansive [interpretation that] 'encompasses
other obligations that may flow from ownership of the property [sold].'"" The
court's remaining analysis smacked strongly of the doctrine of "bankruptcy
uber allis." 8 Importantly, however, the court concluded that the sale free-and9
clear power, emanating from both § 363(f) and a 'grant[] by implication,"'4
includes the power to sell free and clear of claims such as those at issue in
Trans World Airlines, which would normally accrue against the purchaser of
the assets in question under the doctrine of successor liability.50 Therefore, the
EEOC claims were stripped from the assets and for all intents and purposes
eliminated.
The following subparts of this Article describe in more detail the
procedure and conditions for a sale free and clear of claims and interests that
have become at least as important in Chapter 11 practice as the plan
confirmation process. The key differences between the "preplan sale free and
clear" and "plan confirmation" processes are that the sale process (i) occurs
much faster, (ii) has fewer points of objection or leverage for unsecured
creditors and other low-priority parties in interest, and (iii) does not afford
these parties an opportunity to bargain for the amount of any eventual

44. Id. at 286.
45. Id. at 286-87.
46. Id. at 287.
47. Id. at 288-89 (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 363.06[1] (Lawrence P. King
ed., 15th ed. rev. 1998)).
48. "Bankruptcy Over All"-a rule of decision that can be applied to easily resolve all
collisions of bankruptcy law and other bodies of law, although one may question whether the
rule of decision is right in such circumstances.
49. Trans WorldAirlines, 322 F.3d at 292 (quoting Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S.
225, 227 (1991)).
50. Id. at 293.
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distribution on unsecured claims. Generally, all of these effects are negative
from the perspective of a tort victim or lawyer.
A. Sections 363(f)and 1141(c)5
52
Bankruptcy Code § 363(0 permits a trustee or debtor in possession to
sell property of the estate free and clear of interests in the property if any one
of five conditions is met.53 The section provides:

The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this sectionfree
and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate,
only if-

(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and
clear of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be
sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to
accept a money satisfaction of such interest.'
Although § 363 can be used to implement a confirmed plan, it can also be
used on a freestanding basis to authorize a preplan sale free and clear through
a trustee's or debtor in possession's motion to sell." In addition, Bankruptcy
Code § 1141(c) can explicitly render assets free and clear of claims and
of plan confirmation, consummation, and
interests through the process
56
postconfirmation vesting:

51. The text and footnotes of this subpart are largely derived from Kuney,
MisinterpretationsI, supra note *,at 238-44.
52. See II U.S.C. § 902(5) (2000) (defining "trustee" generally to mean "debtor" in
Chapter 9 cases); § 1107(a) (granting a Chapter II debtor in possession the rights, powers, and
duties otherwise provided for the trustee under the Bankruptcy Code); § 1203 (granting trustee
rights and powers to the Chapter 12 debtor); § 1303 (granting trustee rights and powers to the
Chapter 13 debtor).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (stating that the sale free-and-clear power may be used "only if"
one of five express conditions is met).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (emphasis added).
55. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001 (setting forth motion practice procedure for, inter alia,sales
free and clear). Absent an objection, and assuming that the pleadings provide an evidentiary
basis to support the sale, there is not even the need for a hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (defining
the phrase "after notice and a hearing" as authorizing court action if notice is given properly,
and there is either no request for or no time for a hearing).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § I 123(a)(5) (allowing the plan to provide for the sale or transfer of
property); § 1123(b)(3) (allowing the plan to "provide for the settlement or adjustment of any
claim or interest"); § 123(b)(4) (allowing the plan to "provide for the sale of... substantially
all of the [assets] of the estate"); § 1141 (c) (allowing postconfirmation vesting of property "free
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Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section and except
as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, after
confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear
ofall claims and interestsof creditors, equity security holders, and of general

partners in the debtor. "
The postconfirmation vesting power can only be invoked under a confirmed
plan."
Perhaps because of the ease of proceeding to sale by motion rather than by
confirmed plan of reorganization, § 363(f)'s sale free-and-clear power has
been interpreted expansively and extensively 9 while § 1141 (c)'s vesting freeand-clear power, which is broader than § 363(f) on its face, has been largely
ignored.' The sale or vesting free-and-clear powers involve a number of
issues, which courts have resolved in ways that could not have been predicted
when the statute was enacted in 1979. For example, the term "interest"-the
group of things that an asset may be sold or vested free and clear of-is not
defined in the Bankruptcy Code, 6' despite detailed definitions for many similar
foundational terms.6 2 Also, courts have largely ignored the absence of the
word "claims" in § 363(0 and the contrast of that section's language with that
of § 1141 (c), which explicitly speaks of vesting free and clear of claims and
interests under a confirmed plan.63 Despite the absence of the word "claims"
in § 363(0, preplan sales free and clear of claims are routine.'
This judicial treatment, in turn, has led to the practice of today: throwing
companies into bankruptcy merely to effect an asset sale of a business or
division.6" Moreover, subsequent review of these sales-free-and-clear orders
and clear of all claims and interests").
57. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (emphasis added). Section 1141(c) complements or enables the
portion of § 1123(b) that allows a plan to contain provisions "for the sale of all or substantially
all of the property of the estate." § 1 123(b)(4).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c).
59. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note *,at 241.
60. See Kuney, MisinterpretationsII, supra note *,at 293.
61. See Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. Dematteis/MacGregor, JV,209 F.3d 252,257 (3d Cir.
2000) ("The term 'any interest,' as used in section 363(f), is not defined anywhere in the
Bankruptcy Code."); Minstar, Inc. v. Plastech Research, Inc. (In re Arctic Enters., Inc.), 68 B.R.
71, 78-80 (D. Minn. 1986) (construing "interests" under § 1141(c) to include liens).
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (defining over 55 basic terms, but not "interest").
63. See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283,293 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
that nonplan sale of TWA's assets was free and clear of employment discrimination and travel
voucher claims connected to or arising out of those assets).
64. Although a treatise prepared by perhaps the preeminent corporate restructuring firm
describes the practice and notes the lack of express language in § 363(o to authorize sales free
and clear of claims, it glosses over the matter in a footnote that draws upon historical equitable
powers and policy arguments. See I WELL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, REORGANIZING FAILING
BUSINESSES 11-23 & n.80 (Supp. 2003).
65. See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, Napster FilesforChapter11 Shelter, WALL ST. J.,June 4,
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is largely squelched because § 363(m) moots most appeals6 before they can
67
be briefed and considered on even the first rung of the appellate ladder.
The following subparts discuss the existing precedent regarding § 363(0
and the interpretation of the word "interest" in that provision to include
"claims"-making it possible for a business to be sold as a going concern free
and clear of the claims of its tort victims and other creditors.
B. The Conditionsfor Sales Free and Clear"
1. Sections 363(f)(1), (2), (3)-Unsurprising Conditions
Allowing Sale Free and Clear
The first three alternative preconditions for preplan sales free and clear
under § 363(0 are not surprising. Under § 363(f)(1), if "applicable

2002, at B6 ("Napster Inc., in an expected move, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection as
").
prelude to a proposed sale of the company's assets ....
66. Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section[, which are implicated in any § 363(f) sale,] of a sale or lease of property does
not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased
or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of
the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.
I1 U.S.C. § 363(m). This provision creates a race to close a transaction as soon after entry of
the sale order as possible to prevent any stay from issuing and to moot potential appeals. See,
e.g., In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 997-98 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the appellant's failure to
obtain a sty of appeal before the bankruptcy sale closed automatically mooted any appeal).
Under § 363(m) and current best practice, a sale transaction will close shortly after court
approval, and any appeal will be rendered moot, assuming that the court made requisite findings
of good faith and did not grant a stay of the order before the closing. See Va. Dep't of Med.
Assistance Servs. v. Shenandoah Realty Partners, L.P. (In re Shenandoah Realty Partners, L.P.),
248 B.R. 505, 510, 516 (W.D. Va. 2000) (discussing the standards for reviewing a request for
a stay pending appeal and denying the appellant's motion for stay); see, e.g., Official Comm.
of Senior Unsecured Creditors of First RepublicBank Corp. v. First RepublicBank Corp., 106
B.R. 938, 940-41 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (dismissing an appeal from the sale of the debtors' assets,
which was consummated the moment the bankruptcy court's sales order became effective,
because the appellant did not procure a stay of the order pending appeal, and concluding that
"the dog is dead and the appeal is moot"); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002 (indicating that
orders become final and nonappealable ten days after entry).
67. The appellate ladder for bankruptcy decisions has an extra rung over that of the
standard federal civil action. Bankruptcy court decisions are appealed to the district courts or
to bankruptcy appellate panels, whose decisions are appealed to the circuit courts of appeals.
Finally, resort may be had to the United States Supreme Court for a fourth, albeit discretionary,
decision on the matter.
68. The text and footnotes of this subpart are largely derived from Kuney,
MisinterpretationsI, supra note *,at 244-51.
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69
nonbankruptcy law permits [the] sale," the Code also permits the sale.
Essentially, this provision recognizes that there is no reason to limit preexisting rights and remedies in a liquidation or reorganization to benefit
creditors and parties in interest. 0 Despite the apparent overlap, there may be
an advantage to selling assets under § 363(0(1), rather than under applicable
nonbankruptcy law, because § 363(0(1) is not constrained by the procedures
of applicable nonbankruptcy law, which otherwise would be used to justify the
sale.7 Consequently, this simplification may result in savings of both time
and money.
Similarly, under § 363(f)(2), if the party asserting the interest consents to
the sale free and clear of that interest, the Code permits the sale.7" There is no
reason to bar a consensual transaction that will benefit the estate.
Finally, under § 363(f)(3), a sale free and clear of liens is authorized when
it will result in proceeds that exceed the aggregate value of all liens on the
property.73 The liens exist to secure payment; if the payment is made, no liens
are needed.
While the first three of the five § 363(0 alternative conditions are fairly
straightforward, the last two could not be more different. They address
nonconsensual transfers of the highest order and can lead to seemingly bizarre
results if left unchecked.

2. Section 363(f)(4)-Sale When the Interest is in Bona Fide Dispute
Although far-reaching, this condition to the sale free-and-clear power

69. 11 U.S.C. § 363(0(1).
70. Although the phrase "parties in interest" is used in no less than 106 sections of the

Bankruptcy Code and 79 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, it is not defined in
either source.
71. See Scherer v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n (In re Terrace Chalet Apartments, Ltd.),
159 B.R. 821, 824-25 (N.D. II1. 1993) (specifying that the notice, manner, and timing of a sale
free and clear are provided by Rules 2002(a)(2) and 6004(0(1) of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, and not by the state foreclosure law used to justify sale).
72. I1U.S.C. § 363(0(2). The statute requires actual consent, not "implied consent"
based upon a failure to object. In re Roberts, 249 B.R. 152, 155-56 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2000)
(stating that Congress intended to distinguish between "consent" and "failure to object," as
evidenced by the Code's use of the phrase "after notice and a hearing," defined in
§ 102(l)(B)(i), which authorizes the no-hearing-without-objection-and-request-for-hearing
procedure that is pervasive in bankruptcy practice and is colloquially known as "scream or
die"). But see Citicorp Homeowners Servs., Inc. v. Elliot (In re Elliot), 94 B.R. 343, 345-46
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that a party's failure to object is sufficient implied consent to satisfy
§ 363(0(2)); Ragosa v. Canzano (Inre Colarusso), 295 B.R. 166, 175 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2003)
(finding that the adverse possession claimant's "failure to object to the sale, or to seek adequate
protection under § 363(e), and her participation inthe sale as a bidder ... was consent under
§ 363(f)(2)").
73. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3).
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appears easily understood and applied. If the property interest is subject to
free and
bona fide dispute" by the interested parties, the property can be sold 76
7 5 which will generally attach to the proceeds.
This
clear of that interest,
be
to
disputes
provision allows productive assets subject to deadlocking
economically
remain
transferred to a third party, thereby enabling the assets to
productive, while the original parties continue to litigate or otherwise proceed
to resolve their disputes."
Sales under § 363(f)(4) make good sense in the simple case involving
economically productive assets. For example, productive agricultural land, a
74. Although the definition of "bona fide" in this context is less than clear, see CheslockBakker & Assocs., Inc. v. Kremer (In re Downtown Athletic Club), No. M-47(JSM), 2000 WL
744126, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2000) (indicating that a bona fide dispute requires "'an
objective basis for either a factual or legal dispute.' (quoting In re Collins, 180 B.R. 447, 452
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995))), it is clearly the burden of the moving party, debtor in possession, or
trustee to establish that such a dispute exists. See In re Octagon Roofing, 123 B.R. 583, 590
(Bankr. N.D. Iil. 1991). Inthe case ofa secured-creditor-versus-debtor dispute it is unnecessary
that either party have commenced an adversary proceeding challenging the priority, validity,
and extent of the lien at issue. In re Oneida Lake Dev., Inc., 114 B.R. 352, 357-58 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1990) (interpreting Inre Millerburg, 61 B.R. 125, 127-28 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1986)).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 363(0(4). Unlike sales under § 363(f)(2), failure to object to a sale of
property under § 363(f)(4) can constitute implied consent to the sale. In re Elliot, 94 B.R. at
345-46; Pelican Homestead & Say. Ass'n v. Wooten (In re Gabel), 61 B.R. 661, 667 (Bankr.
W.D. La. 1985).
76. Although attachment of the disputed property interest to the proceeds of a sale is the
most common form of adequate protection, it is not the only option. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e);
see also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 95595, at 181-83 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6142-43 (accompanying House
Bill 8200 and indicating that sales free and clear in bona fide dispute circumstances and notions
of adequate protection originated well before enactment of the Code). The mechanism of
providing adequate protection is limited only by the imagination of the parties and the court.
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(d) ("The trustee may use, sell, or lease property ... only to the
extent not inconsistent with any relief granted under [§ 362(c)-(f)].").
77. Nothing prevents the transferee from being an entity owned or controlled by one of
of
the original parties. For instance, the Code contains no express restriction that prevents one
two entities that assert an ownership interest in property from commencing a Chapter 11 case
and forming a separate nondebtor entity to which the property would be sold. See In re Gen.
Bearing Corp., 136 B.R. 361, 364-67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that if the debtor's
proposed § 363(0 sale to an insider-formed entity was instead part of a plan of reorganization,
the sale would be unconfirmable as an "indirect end run around the bankruptcy concepts of
absolute priority and new value," but-although denying approval of the sale on other
grounds-as a preconfirmation sale, the insider arrangement would not prevent approval of the
transaction); cf In re Apex Oil Co., 92 B.R. 847, 869-70 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (concluding
that the mere affiliation of an insider of the debtor with the proposed sale purchaser is
insufficient to show lack of good faith for § 363(b) purposes, and defining good faith as an
absence of"' fraud, collusion between the purchaser and other bidders..., or an attempt to take
grossly unfair advantage of other bidders"' (quoting In re Rock Indus. Mach. Corp., 572 F.2d
1195, 1198 (7th Cir. 1978))).
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housing development, or an oil field might otherwise lie fallow until a multiparty dispute between co-owners, alleged co-owners, and secured creditors is
finally resolved. In the bankruptcy case of an owner of one such asset, a sale
free and clear allows the asset to return to productivity, with attendant societal
benefits, while the owners' and creditors' interests are adequately
protected-generally by being transmuted into an interest in the proceeds of
the sale. 78 Assuming something approaching a perfect market for the sale of
the asset, the owners are not materially harmed and economic efficiency is
served. 79
Essentially, § 363(0(4) provides an expeditious method for clearing title
to a disputed asset.8" This process also ensures that none of the parties
claiming an interest in property subject to the bona fide dispute will directly'
receive the property in question. Their dispute, which may be the precipitating
event making resort to bankruptcy relief necessary, can be resolved in due
course, but the asset will be transferred beyond the dispute and their reach.
Owned by a third party, the asset can return to economic productivity.
Beyond the simple case, however, the § 363(0(4) power to sell free and
clear can lead to bizarre results. Consider the following example: A company
closes a new round of financing by issuing publicly traded securities. It
receives the proceeds of the transaction, twenty million dollars. One week
later, the company releases disappointing information regarding operations,
product development, and its inability to obtain needed governmental
approval. Immediately, a class action securities fraud suit is filed seeking to
rescind the financing and recover the proceeds for the investors. The company
denies wrongdoing, stating that the negative news and results were unknown
until after the transaction had closed.
The plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order to enjoin the company from using the proceeds of the financing pending
resolution of the securities fraud action. However, before the district court can
even consider the request for a temporary restraining order, the company files
a Chapter 11 petition in another district.82 Consequently, the original district
78. See I1 U.S.C. § 363(e).
79. See generally John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy
Policy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 53 (1995) (reviewing bankruptcy and finance theories,
including the efficient market hypothesis).
80. But see In re Owen-Johnson, 118 B.R. 780, 782-83 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990) (refusing
to allow the debtor to use § 363(f)(4) as an "expeditious title clearing device" in order to avoid
having to respond to and resolve the dispute in a pending state-court specific performance
action).
81. No per se prohibition exists which prevents the debtor from regaining indirect
ownership and control through sale to a debtor- or insider-controlled entity. See supranote 73.
82. Strategically, filing the Chapter 11 case in a different district where venue is

otherwise proper will maximize the disruptive effect of the bankruptcy filing on the class action
and minimize the chances of smooth coordination between the district and bankruptcy courts;
likewise, it will disrupt the ease with which the district court can withdraw the reference of the
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83
court action is automatically stayed.
Meanwhile, the company continues to operate using the proceeds of the
financing, while seeking to sell substantially all of its assets-including the
balance of the proceeds-to a "white knight" conglomerate, which will
continue the company's operations in a separate subsidiary, transferring the
twenty million dollars into its central cash concentration account where it will
be used to fund activities of the entire corporate group. The conglomerate will
pay for the acquisition with its own stock, which is not presently publicly
traded." The debtor will distribute this stock to its creditors and stockholders
under its Chapter 11 plan after the stock has been valued by the bankruptcy
6
court.85 If the sale of the assets for stock is approved under § 363(f)(4), the
most that recent investors can ever hope to receive-whether they take their

Chapter 1 case to the bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2000) (venue of cases under
title 11); § 1452 (removal of claims related to bankruptcy cases). If the securities fraud suit and
the Chapter II case are both filed in the same district, the district court can simply withdraw
the reference of the bankruptcy case to the bankruptcy court and hear both the securities fraud
action and the Chapter I1 proceeding, perhaps consolidating them. Of course, interdistrict
transfer is possible, see § 1412 (allowing for change of venue "in the interest of justice or for
the convenience of the parties"), but it creates another level of complexity and delay for the
plaintiffs as the debtor exercises its "second mover" advantage gained through the Chapter 11
filing.
83. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2000).
84. The transaction can be structured, with little difficulty, as a reverse triangular merger.
If so, the conglomerate becomes a publicly traded company without having to comply with the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000), or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000), and their related regulations, see 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240
(2003). See generally George W. Kuney, GoingPublic Via Chapter 11: 11 U.S.C. Sections
1125(e) and 1145, 23 CAL. BANKR. J. 3 (1996) (describing the use of taking a company public
through a Chapter 11 reorganization plan).
85. The problem of stock valuation is very thorny and beyond the scope of this Article.
Even if the stock is already publicly traded, market volatility and the likely effect of bulk sales
by entities receiving stock under the plan make accurate valuation difficult, if not impossible.
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Comment: Stakeholder Interestsand Bankruptcy, 43 U. TORONTO L.J.
711, 712 (1993) (stating that determination of reorganization value by the court for purposes
of valuing securities is a "guess compounded by an estimate"); David Gray Carlson, Secured
Creditorsand the Eely Characterof Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 63, 64 (1991)
(positing that all bankruptcy court valuations are subjective, hypothetical, and inherently
inaccurate); see, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Baer, 651 F.2d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1980) (noting the
absurdity of the court's own valuation of over $90 million of as yet undiscovered oil in the
Canadian Arctic down to the nearest $50); see also George W. Kuney, FinancialReportingby
Chapter 11 Debtors: A Limited Critique of SOP 90-7, 5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 311, 315-16
(1996) (finding accounting guideline unworkable because "reorganization value" is generally
never determined by the court as such and is imprecise in any event). There is no substitute for
the market in this respect.
86. Based upon the bona fide dispute that is the securities fraud action.
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distribution on account of their fraud claims or their equity interests 8 7 -is the
stock of the conglomerate. This outcome certainly is not the same as receiving
their money back or recovering their prior equity interest in the stand-alone
company, and is far from a minor modification oftheir contract, securities law,
and tort rights involved in the class action.
Boiled down, this means that a soon-to-be debtor may be able to obtain
property of another by conversion or fraud and then reorganize, using the
value of the wrongfully obtained property and paying the prior owner only if
that owner later successfully proves her case. In any event, the prior equity
participants will not recover their property, even if they prevail.88 The most
they can expect is payment of its value, or an approximation of that value as
pronounced by a bankruptcy judge, assuming the debtor has sufficient assets
to make such a payment once the adjudication of rights is complete.
The main limitations on this scenario are imposed by the requirements of
a bona fide dispute, good faith, 9 and ajurisdictional finding that the debtor or
estate has an interest in the property in question. 90 These are slight limitations
indeed.

87. For purposes of this hypothetical, assume that equity holders will receive a
distribution or be "in the money" so as to avoid the need for a discussion of I1 U.S.C. § 570(b)
and subordination of securities-based claims to those of unsecured creditors.
88. This may be an overstatement. Under applicable nonbankruptcy law, courts
recognize a distinction between whether or not the debtor acquires title to the property. If title
is obtained, even if subject to rescission, the property will constitute property of the estate and
a sale can proceed under § 363(0(4) and the scenario discussed in the text. In contrast, if good
title is not obtained, such as when the debtor obtains the property by outright theft, the property
will not constitute property of the estate and §363 cannot be used to effect its sale. See Kitchen
v. Boyd (In re Newpower), 233 F.3d 922, 931 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that money
misappropriated by the debtor pre-petition was not property of the estate, but that proceeds of
that money were property of the estate).
89. Good faith under § 363 is marked by the absence of "fraud, collusion between the
purchaser and other bidders .... or an attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of other
bidders." In re Rock Indus. Mach. Corp., 572 F.2d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting further
that good faith is founded solely upon one's integrity of conduct during the sale process),
quoted in Bleaufontaine, Inc. v. Roland Int'l (In re Bleaufontaine, Inc.), 634 F.2d 1383, 1388
n.7 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981), In re Apex Oil Co., 92 B.R. 847, 869 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988).
90. ITNX v. Alpha Bus. Group, Inc. (In re Hurt), 9 Fed. Appx. 780, 781-82 (9th Cir.
2001); see Cont'l Nat'l Bank of Miami v. Sanchez (In re Toledo), 170 F.3d 1340, 1343 n.3
(11 th Cir. 1999) ("It is questionable whether § 363(f) gives a bankruptcy court power to order
or approve a sale of property that belongs only to an entity in which the estate holds an interest,
and not to the estate itself."); Missouri v. United States Bankr. Court, 647 F.2d 768, 778 (8th
Cir. 1981) (questioning the ability of the bankruptcy court to authorize the sale of property
without a showing that the estate has a substantial ownership right to such property).
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3. Section 363((5)-The Standard That Could Have
Swallowed the Others
The final alternative condition for a sale free and clear under § 363(0 is
potentially the broadest of all: § 363(f)(5). It provides for sale free and clear
of interests if the interest holder "could be compelled, in a legal or equitable
proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest."'" The
requirement is phrased in the passive voice and does not identify who or what
is instituting the hypothetical proceeding that compels the interest holder to
accept a money judgment. This suggests that there are no limits on the identity
of the hypothetical actor or the type of legal or equitable proceeding. Plainly
read, the statute indicates that if an entity can be forced to accept money for
the property interest at law or in equity, its interest can be stripped off the asset
in a § 363 sale.92
93
C. Sales Free and Clear of Claims?

In a dramatic expansion of § 363(0's language into an interpretation that
parallels the language of § 1141(c), some courts have concluded that
unsecured9 4 claims are a type of "interest" in property from which the property
may be sold free and clear. 95 Although fundamentally flawed (since § 363(0
91. 11 U.S.C. § 363(0(5) (2000). This Article refers to the legal or equitable proceeding
as the "hypothetical proceeding."
92. See Basil H. Mattingly, Sale ofPropertyof the EstateFree and Clearof Restrictions
and Covenants in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 431, 451-52 (1996) (championing
this interpretation and the use of eminent domain as the source of a § 363(0(5) power of sale
free and clear of all interests). Eminent domain, or, more precisely, a proceeding to recover for
an uncompensated taking by the state under its eminent domain power, is a legal or equitable
proceeding, depending upon the forum and the regime under which it is brought. See
MisinterpretationsI, supra note *, at 254 n.74.
93. The text and footnotes of this subpart are largely derived from Kuney,
MisinterpretationsI, supra note *, at 257-69.
94. Because most tort claims are unsecured claims, they are the claims discussed here.
For a discussion of sales free and clear of secured claims, see Kuney, MisinterpretationsI,
supra note *, at 257 nn.84-88 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
that the sale of airline assets was free and clear of employment discrimination and travel
voucher claims arising out of or connected to those assets); United Mine Workers of Am. 1992
Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. (In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573,
582 (4th Cir. 1996) (deferring to the apparent intent of Congress that the statute be read broadly
after stating, "Yet while the plain meaning of the phrase 'interest in such property' suggests that
not all general rights to payment are encompassed by the statute, Congress did not expressly
indicate that, by employing such language, it intended to limit the scope of section 363(0 to in
rem interests .... ); P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc. v. Va. Dep't of Med. Assistance Servs. (In
re P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc.), 189 B.R. 90, 94 & n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) ("Under a
§ 363(0 sale, the purchaser acquires the property free and clear of all interests. Thus, the sale

TENNESSEE LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 71:81

does not include the term "claim" while § 1141 (c) does), this interpretation is
pervasive and is firmly defended.96 This interpretation also has powerful
consequences, which primarily include the use of a nonplan sale using § 363(0
to purportedly cut off successor liability that, under applicable nonbankruptcy
law, could lie against the purchaser after a sale of substantially all of the assets
of a business.97
The general rule is that a purchaser of assets for fair consideration does not
extinguishes [a general unsecured creditor's] interest in the property because (the general
unsecured creditor's] interest attaches to the proceeds of the sale.... [The creditor] possesses
a contingent, unsecured, nonpriority claim."). Putting aside the thorny problem of future claims
(i.e., those that have not yet arisen, such as a future wrongful death action arising out of the
future use of a product manufactured defectively by a debtor pre-petition), the courts
consistently hold that a preplan sale can be free and clear of existing claims held by creditors
that receive notice. See, e.g., Walker v. Lee (In re Rounds), 229 B.R. 758, 763 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1999) ("[E]ven notwithstanding the Code's concern for finality in bankruptcy sales, it 'will
not.., protect a [buyer] . . . where no notice [was] given to the lienholder[;] [s]uch a purchaser
will be held to have purchased subject to the lien."' (quoting W. Auto Supply Co. v. Savage
Arms, Inc., 43 F.3d 714, 721 (1 st Cir. 1994) (first and second alteration added)); In re Burd, 202
B.R. 590, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (noting that either the trustee or the debtor-inpossession "'may sell properties of the estate free and clear of liens by merely complying with
the notice requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(2), (c)(1) and can effectively conclude the
sale free and clear of any liens and encumbrances of all parties who were properly notified and
given an opportunity to object ... "' (quoting NORTON BANKRUPTCY RULES PAMPHLET 361
(1995-96) (editor's comment to FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(c)))).
96. As one example, consider the following remarks made by two commentators, one of
whom is a federal bankruptcy judge:
State and federal decisions holding a bankruptcy purchaser liable as a successor of the
debtor are directly at odds with Congressional intent to allow a debtor to sell its assets free
and clear of all claims and interests therein. This conflict poses a constitutional dilemma
that must be resolved in favor of the specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Absent
evidence of collusion or strong public policy concerns enunciated by Congress, a
bankruptcy purchaser should not be held liable for a debtor's obligations. Any further
extension of successor liability in the bankruptcy context is a policy decision best
implemented by Congress pursuant to its exclusive jurisdiction over the subject of
bankruptcy.
William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan, InequalityAmong Creditors: The Unconstitutional
Use of Successor Liability to Create a New Class of PriorityClaimants, 4 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 325, 364 (1996). Judge Bodoh and Ms. Morgan failed to note that § 363(f)'s "specific
provisions" nowhere refer to "claims." Their point, based upon notions of broad federal
preemption, is well taken-but only with regard to free-and-clear sales accomplished using
§ 1141(c) and a confirmed plan to vest property in a purchase free and clear of prior claims.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently endorsed the nonplan sale
free and clear of claims, including successor-liability claims. See Trans World Airlines, 322
F.3d at 288-90; see also supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
97. See supra Part I (discussing the definition of "claim" and what claims can be
discharged or stripped of assets or a business through a § 363(f) sale or § 1141(c) postconfirmation vesting).
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become liable for the seller's liabilities, even when the purchaser purchases
substantially all of the assets of the seller, unless the doctrine of successor
liability comes into play.98 Absent fraudulent transfers, acquisition of all or
substantially all of a company's assets is a necessary but, by itself, insufficient
element for a finding of successor liability." Where exceptions to the general
rule of no-successor-liability-for-asset-purchasers are accepted, they typically
require an additional element over mere acquisition of substantially all the
10
assets of an entity to impose successor liability." 0 The findings ' that can
constitute the additional element needed to impose successor liability on an
asset purchaser include:
(1) The presence of an express or implied assumption of liabilities in the
purchase agreement;
(2) The transaction amounts to a consolidation or a "de facto merger";
(3) The purchasing corporation is "merely a continuation" of the seller;
(4) The transfer of assets to the purchaser is for the fraudulent purpose of
escaping liability for the seller's debts; or
°
(5) In some jurisdictions that apply the "product line" exception," the
98. See Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 776, 783-84 (Ct. App. 1971),
disapprovedby Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 5, 11 (Cal. 1977); Dana Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
668 A.2d 752, 756 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("[A successor] will be exposed to liability only if a court
follows some exception to the traditional rule that a transfer of assets does not pass liabilities
unless the transferee agrees to assume them."), affd, 670 A.2d 1337 (Del. 1995) (unpublished
table decision); Husak v. Berkel, Inc., 341 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) ("Ordinarily
when one company sells or transfers all its assets to another company, the latter is not liable for
the debts and liabilities of the transferor simply by virtue of its succession to the transferor's
property."); Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1983) ("It is the
general rule that acorporation which acquires the assets of another is not liable for the torts of
its predecessor.").
99. See Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding
no successor liability because the purchaser had not acquired accounts, customer lists, trade
names, or goodwill); see also McGraw-Edison, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 784 (finding that a purchaser
who did not acquire substantially all of a business and who paid valuable and adequate
consideration was not liable in tort for defective products manufactured by a seller that
continued to exist as a separate corporate entity with substantial assets to meet its debts).
100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 12 (1998) (collecting and
discussing authorities). Essentially, successor liability allows the subsequent owner of a going
concern to be held liable for the torts of a prior owner. The starting point for all forms of
successor liability is the sale of substantially all the assets of a business, and the five additional,
alternative elements, see infratext accompanying note 101, which largely point to the continued
operation of those assets as the business that caused the liability in the first place.
101. For a summary of authorities that have made these findings, see Kuney,
MisinterpretationsI, supra note *, at 259 n.92.
102. In 1977, the Supreme Court ofCalifornia first introduced the "product line" exception
when it decided Ray v. Alad Corp, 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977). Since that time, courts in
Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington have adopted
the product line exception, while courts in Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia,
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asset purchaser continued production of the transferor's product line with the
assets purchased.
Interpreting § 363(f) to allow preplan sales free and clear of claims also
expands the number of cases in which such a sale can take place. Because
Chapter 7 trustees operate in a nonplan environment, 10 3 if the power to sell free
and clear of claims were confined to vesting of title under a confirmed plan
and § 1141 (c), these trustees would not be able to conduct sales free and clear
of claims."°4 Unlike most benefits created by the Code, this power to shield
purchasers from successor liability only indirectly benefits debtors and their
creditors-arguably by increasing the price that purchasers are willing to pay
for the assets involved-and instead directly and substantially benefits the
third-party purchaser, who may otherwise be a complete stranger to the case.'15
The one exception to this outcome would be in precisely the area where it is
fairly clear that the free and clear process cannot shield the purchaser: future
claims.' °6
Making the analytical leap to the conclusion that claims are a subset of
interests"0 7 has conveniently allowed preplan sales free and clear of interests

Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin have rejected it. For a sampling of decisions from these
jurisdictions, see Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note *, at 259 n.92.
103. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2000) (Chapter 7 is devoid of plan provisions).
104. This, in turn, might depress the prices that trustees would realize from sales, arguably
impacting negatively on unsecured creditors. This negative impact, however, is the product of
correctly interpreting the statute as enacted and erasing a judicial gloss that has, perhaps,
produced a windfall for unsecured creditors.
105. Based upon pure economic theory, purchasers should be willing to pay more for the
property free from liability than they would otherwise, and the higher purchase price would
benefit creditors. Although, assuming something approaching a perfect market, this outcome
is true in theory, it is not-in the author's experience-the case in practice. The ability to sell
free and clear has the primary effect of enticing a purchaser to consider a transaction that might
otherwise be ignored because it has too much "hair" on it-much of which is the threat of
unknown or contingent claims and successor liability. Once the purchaser entertains the
transaction, little value is, at least expressly, attributed to the free and clear nature of the sale.
Further, the bankruptcy sale process is not a perfect market in any sense; there is no perfect
information, no multitude of willing buyers and sellers, and no absence of a compulsion to buy
or sell. The process is often controlled by insiders and secured creditors who, in reality, have
other things on their minds than increasing returns to unsecured creditors. In sum, these
characteristics of a typical bankruptcy sale, when combined with the use of blanket liens in
secured financing, mean that whatever excess value the purchaser does attribute to the free-andclear nature of the sale will generally not trickle down below the ranks of the secured creditors
and administrative claimants.
106. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (discussing the early view that future
claims could be cut off, and the more recent and better reasoned view that they cannot be cut
off consistent with due process under the current statute).
107. The leap appears to be driven by the observation that successor-liability rights follow
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and claims under § 363(0. Therefore, through conflation of these terms,
purchasers are protected from successor liability without having to navigate
through the plan proposal and confirmation process that otherwise would
allow purchasers to use § 1141(c) to accomplish the same end.
Despite § 363(f)'s explicit reference to sales free and clear solely of
are commonly referred to as sales free and clear of
"interests,"'" s these sales
"claims and interests."' ' Moreover, bankruptcy courts often enter extensive
findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting § 363(f) sale orders that
contain detailed provisions insulating the purchaser from liability."' Given
the property; however, this observation is imprecise and, consequently, fails to convert such
claims into in rem claims. A review ofthe development of successor liability underjudge-made
law reveals the more accurate observation that such claims follow the business,not the property.
See Fairchild Aircraft Inc v. Campbell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 920
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) ("[W]hile successor liability may give a party an alternative entity
from whom to recover, the doctrine does not convert the claim to an in rem action running
against the property being sold. Nor does the claim [exist independently from] the underlying
liability of the entity that sold the assets." (footnote omitted)), vacatedby 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1998).
108. When the statute addresses claims and interests, it does so explicitly. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 1141(c) (stating that property dealt with under a confirmed plan of reorganization
passes free and clear of "all claims and interests"); § 1327(c) (stating that confirmation of a plan
vests property of the estate in the debtor free and clear of "any claim or interest"). Interpreting
"interest" to include "claims" makes the use of the phrase "claims and interests" two-thirds
surplus, in terms of word count, both as used in the statute and as used in practice. The statute
was carefully worded, and the use of specific terms should be honored. Cf United States v.
Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 n.5 (1989) ("When Congress wanted to restrict the
application of a particular provision of the Code to [voluntary] liens, it used the term 'security
interest."').
109. For examples of representative cases using such language to describe the title and
context of sales orders, see Kuney, MisinterpretationsI, supra note *,at 265 n. 115.
110. In practice these findings of fact and conclusions of law are drafted by the debtor's
counsel and the purchaser's counsel, who insert detailed provisions to insulate their clients and
themselves from liability. The following finding of fact and conclusion of law from a § 363
sale order is typical:
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code sections 105(a) and 363(), upon the closing under the
Agreement, [the purchaser] shall acquire all title, right and interest in the [purchased
assets], subject only to the Assumed Liabilities (as defined in the Agreement). The
[purchased assets] shall be free and clear of(a) all Encumbrances and Other Interests, and
(b) all debts arising in any way in connection with any acts, or failures to act, of the
Debtors or the Debtors' predecessors or affiliates, claims (as that term is defined in the
Bankruptcy Code), obligations, demands, guaranties, options, rights, contractual
commitments, restrictions, interests and matters of any kind and nature, whether arising
prior to or subsequent to the commencement of these cases, and whether imposed by
agreement, understanding, law, equity or otherwise (collectively, the "Claims"), with all
such Encumbrances, Other Interests and Claims to attach to the net proceeds of the sale
of the [purchased assets] in the order of their priority, with the same validity, force and
effect which they now have as against the [purchased assets], subject to any claims and
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the breadth of these findings and conclusions, those championing them would
prefer for the free and clear power to emanate from § 363-rather than
emanating merely from § 105(a), the Bankruptcy Code's "all writs"
provision"-to protect the order and findings from vulnerability on appeal." 2
This practice is national in scope." 3
Thus, although there is no indication that § 363(f) was intended to be used
to bar successor-liability claims," 4 and although § 1141(c) provides a plan

defenses the Debtors may possess with respect thereto.
In re FPA Med. Mgmt., Inc., Nos. 98-1596 (PJW) to 98-1685 (PJW), 5 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept.
23, 1998) (order authorizing the sale of purchased assets free and clear of liens, claims,
encumbrances, and interests) (on file with the Tennessee Law Review and author).
111. Section 105(a) provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of
an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte,
taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or
implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
112. Section 105 is a fall-back equitable power provision used to plug what would
otherwise be gaps in the statutory scheme; however, § 105's grant of power is limited if other
portions of title 11 address a subject scheme. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485
U.S. 197, 206-07 (1988) (noting that bankruptcy courts' equitable powers are limited and
concluding that such powers should not be exercised to prevent conduct that is specifically
authorized by the Code); see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (prohibiting the discharge of debts of
nondebtor entities, which would presumably include purchasers). But see FairchildAircraft,
184 B.R. at 933 n.28 (noting that a § 105 injunction can be used to block claims of successor
liability but cannot bind future claimants who do not yet hold "claims" and are not part of the
plan or sale process). See generally Jeffrey Davis, Cramming Down Future Claims in
Bankruptcy: Fairness, Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Lessons of the Piper
Reorganization, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329 (1996) (reviewing and analyzing successor liability,
the future claim problem, and the evolution of case law in this regard).
113. See Kuney, MisrepresentationsI, supra note *, at 265 n.1 15, for a discussion of the
titles and terms of sale orders in four cases: one in Arizona, one in California, one in Delaware,
and one in New York.
114. Legislative history accompanying the enactment of House Bill 8200 is devoid of
references to successor liability. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963. Although courts have expressed disbelief over a plain language reading
of § 363(f) in terms of the scope of true property interests that can be stripped away and the
hypothetical proceedings that can be used to satisfy § 363(f)(5), see Kuney, Misinterpretations
II, supra note *, at 310 n. 100, they have readily accepted a reading of the statute that includes
the words "claims and," which nowhere appear in the statute. Instead, courts only balk, if at
all, at the prospect of stripping off the claims of future, unidentifiable claimants on due process
grounds, given the inability to give meaningful notice to those claimants. See, e.g., Fairchild
Aircraft, 184 B.R. at 934; In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619,625 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994),
aff'd sub nom. Epstein v. Official Comm. of Undersecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper
Aircraft, Inc. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff'd as modified, 58
F.3d 1573 (1I1th Cir. 1995).
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confirmation process to achieve this same end," 5 a majority of courts have
interpreted § 363(f) as permitting the sale of property free and clear of claims
that otherwise could be asserted against the buyer of the assets under the
doctrine of successor liability. 1 6 Some courts have used § 363(0 to bar tort
claims that arise postsale from the use of a product manufactured presale or
7
pre-petition, although this use is questionable in light of more recent cases.

115. See I1U.S.C. § 1141(c).
116. These courts have long embraced the concept that "claims" are a subset of"interests,"
apparently without much thought or analysis. See, e.g., Paris Mfg. Corp. v. Ace Hardware
Corp. (In re Paris Indus. Corp.), 132 B.R. 504, 510 n. 14 (D. Me. 1991) (remarking in dicta that
a sale free and clear of future claims would be consistent with policies of the Bankruptcy Code);
Am. Living Sys. v. Bonapfel (In re All Am. of Ashbum, Inc.), 56 B.R. 186, 189-90 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1986) (collecting cases in support of its implicit conclusion that claims are a subset
of interests, and holding that assets sold under § 363(f) were free and clear of successor-liability
claims), affd,805 F.2d 1515 (1 th Cir. 1986); Inre Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (considering, impliedly as an interest, claims for indemnification and
contribution), affd, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988); Forde v. Kee-Lox Mfg. Co., 437 F. Supp. 631,
634-35 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that a sale free and clear barred a civil rights suit based upon
the defendant's presale conduct), aff'd, 584 F.2d 4 (2d Cir 1978). But see W. Auto Supply Co.
v. Savage Arms, Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.), 43 F.3d 714, 723 (lst Cir. 1994) (refusing to
enjoin a suit commenced by the holder of a presale claim against the purchaser of the debtor's
assets because the claimant was given insufficient notice of the sale and there was no showing
that the successor-liability action posed a genuine threat to the legitimate operation of the
Bankruptcy Code). The reaction of practitioners to Savage Arms has been predictable:
increased attention to wide notice, including notice by publication, and inclusion of a selfserving finding in § 363(o sale orders establishing the "necessity" of a bar to successor liability
to consummate the sale. I WELL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 64, at 11-25 to -26.
The one limit on sales free and clear of claims appears to be that claims which first arise
postsale will not be barred by the free and clear provisions of the sale order. See Piper Aircraft,
58 F.3d at 1577 (establishing the "Piper Test," which states that, to be barred by a sale free-andclear order, a claim must be based upon the debtor's pre-petition activities, and "events
occurring before confirmation, or a preplan sale, must create a relationship, such as contact,
exposure, impact, or privity between the claimant and the debtor's product"); accord Fairchild
Aircraft, 184 B.R.at 933.
117. Cases supporting the proposition that a sale free and clear bars future claims include
Paris Industries Corp., 132 B.R. at 509 (barring a tort claim, based upon a defective sled
manufactured and sold by the predecessor pre-petition, when asserted against the purchaser of
assets at a 363(f) sale), and All American of Ashburn, 56 B.R. at 190. But see Chi. Truck
Drivers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 50-51 (7th Cir. 1995)
(discussing the troubling and problematic nature of a per se rule barring successor-liability
claims when the injury has not yet occurred and the claimant is not known, and thus has no
opportunity to receive notice and be heard to object); Savage Arms, 43 F.3d at 723; ZerandBemal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994). More recent decisions seemingly
foreclose this application of the statute and, on due process grounds, limit the claims that can
be barred. See, e.g., Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that, as to future
tort claims such as products liability claims, no "claim" arises until the actual harm occurs and
rejecting the notion that a pedestrian has a contingent claim against every automobile that might

TENNESSEE LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 71:81

It was even used in MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re JohnsManville Corp.) to support a mass tort debtor's settlement with its insurer
featuring the establishment of a settlement fund by the insurer and the entry
of a channeling injunction, forcing tort plaintiffs to assert their claims, if at all,
against that fund." 9
D. The Effects of Including "Claims" Within "Interests" in § 363W9'20
The courts' inclusion of "claims" within "interests" under § 363(f)'12 and
122
the erosion of the bias against preplan sales of substantial groups of assets
have led to the use of Chapter 11 both to achieve a prenegotiated sale of a
business or group of assets and to protect the buyer from successor liability.
These expansive views, when combined with other characteristics of Chapter
123
11 proceedings-the lack of any requirement that a debtor be insolvent,

hit him); FairchildAircraft, 184 B.R. at 927; PiperAircraft, 162 B.R. at 628; see also Barbara
J.Houser et al., Mass Torts and Other Future Claims, in I ALl- ABA COMM. ON CONTINUING
PROF'L EDUC., ALI-ABA COURSES OF STUDY, BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 97-107 (1997)
(collecting authorities and analyzing different approaches to the problem).
118. 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988).
119. Id. at 93; see Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d
636, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding the confirmation of a plan with similar provisions); In
re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 751 (E.D. Va. 1988) (confirming a plan with a channeling
injunction), aff'd sub nom. Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694
(4th Cir. 1989). These cases and others like them dealing with channeling injunctions and
nondebtor releases are beyond the scope of this Article, except to note their existence and their
connection to the power to sell assets (such as insurance rights and proceeds) free and clear of
claims and interests under § 363(0.
120. The text and footnotes of this subpart are largely derived from Kuney,
MisinterpretationsI, supra note *,at 272-86.
121. See supra notes 63-64, 94-119 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 35-50.
123. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); cf Baker v.
Latham Sparrowbush Assocs. (In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc.), 931 F.2d 222,228 (2d Cir.
1991) (noting that although the debtor need not be insolvent to file a bankruptcy petition, it
must be in such "financial stress" that, were it not to file, it "could anticipate the need to file in
the future"). But see Thomas E. Plank, The ConstitutionalLimits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN L.
REv. 487, 545-56 (1996) (positing that balance sheet or cash flow insolvency of the debtor is
an inherent limitation on the Bankruptcy Clause); Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges
Need Not and Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567, 629-36 (1998)
(arguing against the proposed life appointment of bankruptcy judges under Article III of the
U.S. Constitution because, among other reasons, retaining their current status would reinforce
the fact that their activities are limited to the permissible scope of bankruptcy law: the
adjustment of the insolvent debtor-creditor relationship). According to Professor Plank's
research, this principle requires that a debtor may not be in bankruptcy unless the debtor is
insolvent in either a balance sheet sense or a cash flow sense. Id. at 630. He also notes that
there was an explicit insolvency requirement under federal bankruptcy law for liquidations until
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24
vague "[you] know it when [you] see it" standards' regarding good faith in
2
commencing a bankruptcy case, ' and the ability of the dominant parties to
26
create a business justification for a quick sale' -are turning the bankruptcy
courts into the auction houses of choice for businesses with either financial
27
trouble or the potential of liabilities that would otherwise follow their assets.'

1939 and for reorganizations until 1979. Id. at 631 & n.346. The Johns-Manville
rule-insolvency is not required-however, remains hornbook black letter law. In attempting
to harmonize these two views, it should be noted that in today's highly leveraged world of
business, debtors can easily manipulate their balance sheets, operations, and cash flow to
produce the insolvency or looming insolvency that Professor Plank's view requires. See
generally KEVIN J.DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY 60-81 (reviewing the stream of events
leading to Johns-Manville's recognition, on the eve of its bankruptcy filing, of two billion
dollars in contingent asbestos litigation claims that, without invoking the automatic stay by
filing a bankruptcy petition, would have allowed its lenders to accelerate loans and other debts,
thereby rendering its balance sheet insolvent as well as rendering the company unable to meet
its debts as they came due).
124. Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing
the difficulty of defining obscenity with any concreteness).
125. "The test [for good faith] is whether a debtor is attempting to unreasonably deter and
harass creditors or attempting to effect a speedy, efficient reorganization on a feasible basis."
Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Idaho Dep't of Lands
v. Arnold (In re Arnold), 806 F.2d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 1986)); Meadowbrook Investors' Group
v. Thirtieth Place, Inc. (In re Thirtieth Place, Inc.), 30 B.R. 503, 505 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983)
(noting that good faith cannot be denied where it is evident that the debtor is "'attempt[ing] to
effect a speedy efficient reorganization, upon a feasible basis' (quoting In re Levinsky, 23
B.R. 210,218 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982))). "Good faith is lacking only when the debtor's actions
are a clear abuse of the bankruptcy process." Arnold, 806 F.2d at 939 ("The existence of good
faith depends on an amalgam of factors and not upon a specific fact."). The ovular case of
Little Creek Development Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little Creek
Development), 779 F.2d 1068, 1073 (5th Cir. 1986), identified ten common conditions
indicating bad faith, generally aimed at single-asset real estate cases, but which are
unfortunately exhibited by most real-property-owning entities at one time or another, whether
they are financially-strapped or commercial.
126. Compare Wolf v. Weinstein, in which the Supreme Court stated:
[O]ne who exercises control over a reorganization [plan] holds a post which might tempt
him to affect or influence corporate policies-even the shaping of the very plan of
reorganization-for the benefit of his own security holdings but to the detriment of the
Debtor's interests and those of its creditors and other interested groups.
372 U.S. 633, 642 (1963).
127. See Brian L. Davidoff, Reorganizingthe Internet Company, BCD NEWS & COMMENT,
Feb. 7, 2001 (discussing different methods for valuing Internet companies in the bankruptcy
process); Luis Salazar, The Difficulties PractitionersCan Face When Dealing with Dot-Corn
Bankruptcies, 18 BANKR. STRATEGIST, Nov. 2000, at 1 (predicting the deluge of dot-corn
bankruptcies); John Shinal, DeadDot-ComsCan Still Cause Havoc, Bus. WK., Mar. 12,2001,
at 50 (explaining that dot-corn bankruptcy filings have led to the auctioning of computer
equipment at "dirt-cheap prices"); Dot-Corns Filing Bankruptcy Unconventionally (Oct. 15,
20 0
1/10/15/dot-com-bankruptcies.htm.
2001), at http://www.usatoday.con/life/cyber/invest/
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In fact, some counsel generally advise clients who purchase such businesses"8
that the preferred method of acquisition is through a quick Chapter 7 or 11
case featuring a prenegotiated asset purchase agreement and a preplan § 363(f)
sale free and clear. Indeed, it may already constitute malpractice not to at least
advise clients of the potential benefits of this process in many circumstances.
It is difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy the impact of preplan
sale procedures on distributions to unsecured creditors, including tort
claimants. On balance, however, the impact is probably negative. The speed
of the nonplan sale process may help minimize administrative claims in the
case, thus ostensibly benefitting these creditors who, possessing general
unsecured claims, are junior in priority to both secured and priority creditors,
including administrative claimants. However, in reality, this apparent
advantage will generally be of no or very little benefit to tort claimants and
other unsecured creditors. First, distributions to these lower priority creditors
are often extremely low in any event.' 29 These low distributions may be
attributed to the fact that: (i) secured creditors often use blanket liens to
capture the value of all assets at the inception of pre-petition financing or the
extension of debtor-in-possession financing, and (ii) business entities may
select from among many different judgment-proofing strategies that are
3°
designed to channel profits and value to the equity holders and insiders.
Theoretically, any process that decreases higher priority claims and expenses
would benefit these classes, but empirical evidence has yet to be gathered
showing any significant benefit.
Second, the increase in preplan sales appears to negatively impact the

128. The protections afforded by conducting the transaction within a bankruptcy case are
not limited to purchasers. The officers, directors, and insiders of the debtor-seller can often
benefit from having the sale approved by a bankruptcy court, which can, and often does, enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law that accompany the sale order to the effect that, among
other things, the sale is for fair value and reasonably equivalent consideration; the bankruptcy
case and the sale are supported by the informed business judgment of the officers and directors
of the debtor, formed after reasonable inquiry under the circumstances; and the sale is in the
best interests ofstockholders, creditors, and all other stakeholders. Such findings are, ofcourse,
drafted by the prevailing parties to serve their own interests in defending against later claims
and lawsuits. They are often justified, if at all, as a condition of closing imposed by the
purchaser, who seeks to insulate itself from claims of fraudulent transfer or similar claims that
could result in rescission, avoidance or unwinding of the sale, or litigation-all of which could
distract the insiders of the debtor from their postsale duties to the purchaser, who will hire them
immediately after closing. See generallyIn re Automationsolutions Int'l, LLC, 274 B.R. 527
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing and disparaging an over broad "comfort order," drafted by
the purchaser, approving the sale).
129. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; infra note 130 and accompanying text.
130. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 147, 152-53 (1998) (describing judgment-proofing techniques, including leases, secured
lending instruments, sale agreements, franchise agreements, licenses, and the formation of
operating subsidiaries).
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ability of low priority creditors to meaningfully participate in the proceedings
3
and look after their interests, to the extent they are so inclined. ' When a
debtor's business is sold preplan, these creditors lose the specific protections
of§ 1129, including the best-interests-of-creditors test,' the requirement that
33
there be at least one consenting impaired class, and the absolute priority
34
Although creditors' committees and their counsel ensure some
rule.
protections, the speed at which preplan sales proceed certainly makes it less
likely that individual creditors will be able to meaningfully participate. On
balance, it is hard to see how speeding up the reorganization case increases the
negotiating leverage of these creditors or provides anything but a decrease in
the flow and quality of information they receive and the ability to protect their
particular interests.
Finally, depriving unsecured creditors of their successor-liability claims
recovery.'1
against a purchaser deals a devastating blow to their chances of
Absent a strong showing that the values received by the estate will be
enhanced sufficiently to meaningfully increase dividends to general unsecured
creditors, there is nothing to outweigh these negatives.
In some sense, the bankruptcy system is being used to solve the problem
131. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-SystemsFailure Under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 248 (1983) ("[C]reditors '[take] little
interest' in bankruptcy proceedings only because bankruptcy legislation ha[s] failed to provide
the means for them to exercise meaningful control or to make their participation profitable."
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 92 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6053
(alteration in original))).
132. 1I U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2000) (stating that a confirmable plan must provide that
every creditor either accepts the plan or will receive at least as much as it would in a
hypothetical liquidation).
133. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). Because this element is not present in the preplan sale
process, theoretically the debtor could proceed to sale without support from any class of
creditors. Although this possibility is unlikely in practice, it is a dramatic difference from the
plan process.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
135. See In re Lady H Coal Co., 193 B.R. 233,249 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1996) (declining
the debtors' request that the court reject the debtors' collective bargaining agreement, but
approving the proposed sale of substantially all of the debtors' assets free and clear of any
interest imposed by that agreement); accord N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell
Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.), 981 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1992); After Six,
Inc. v. Phila. Joint Bd. (In re After Six, Inc.), No. 93-111505, 1993 WL 160385, at *2 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. May 13, 1993). The preplan sale free-and-clear process effectively guts whatever
protection would otherwise be afforded by § 1114 and § I 129(a)(13). The only argument that
can be made in support of this result is that the same result would follow if the liquidation of
the debtor's assets were to take place in a Chapter 7 case. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 134
B.R. 515, 521 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (recognizing that § 1114 does not apply to Chapter 7
cases, but concluding that, based on the statute's plain language, it must apply to liquidating
Chapter 11 cases, even though the legislative history suggests that Congress believed that
Chapter 11 did not include liquidating cases when it enacted the statute).
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caused by business purchasers' inability to take much comfort in the
representations, warranties, and indemnities of the seller of a business, whether
failing or not, or of its principals. A free-and-clear order that is final and
nonappealable, backed by the Bankruptcy and Supremacy Clauses of the
United States Constitution, and entitled to full faith and credit in federal and
state courts across the country is an effective tool indeed. By foreclosing the
claims as a matter of law, the parties need not design an effective transactional
mechanism to allocate risk between them--section 363(f), as interpreted,
eliminates the risk. The losers under this scheme include tort victims,
smaller, low priority creditors, and slow-moving
successor-liability claimants,
36
entities and agencies.
III. THE EFFECT OF INCLUDING ENTITY COVERAGE IN
THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY POLICIES

Many debtors facing massive tort liability hold insurance policies under
37
which their directors and officers are beneficiaries ("D&O Policies").
Further, directors and officers may face exposure to liability for the debtor's
torts either directly, as codefendants that knowingly or negligently participate
in the tortious conduct, or indirectly, under theories such as breach of fiduciary
duty to creditors and shareholders or the alter ego doctrine. In such instances,
the existence of the D&O Policy may appear to the tort claimant as a blessing
and assurance of a payoff if a judgment is entered and sustained on appeal.
Enter bankruptcy, again, with a wrinkle. The proceeds of the D&O Policy
may be held to be property of the debtor's estate, in which case claims for
those policy proceeds may be stayed or even permanently prohibited.
A. D&O Policies
Although § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code stays any sort of litigation that
potential plaintiffs could bring against a debtor in bankruptcy, the automatic
136. This may be yet another example of the trend towards the elimination of any real
liability of incorporeal entities beyond their insurance policies. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14-38 (1996) (arguing that American businesses are
rendering themselves judgment proof because of the ease with which a modem debtor can grant
secured credit, the growth of asset securitization, the availability of foreign havens for hiding
assets, and the traditional ways of avoiding legal liability, such as scattering assets among
subsidiaries). But see James J. White, CorporateJudgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn
LoPucki 's The Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363, 1368-95 (1998) (arguing that American
businesses are not judgment proof and pointing to data showing that public companies grant
much more modest levels of security than would be necessary to become judgment proof, that
most companies have lien-free assets that greatly exceed their liabilities, and that most
companies carry substantial amounts of liability insurance).
137. D&O Policies are insurance policies that generally insure a corporation's directors
and officers against personal liability arising from their employment with the corporation.
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13 Thus,
stay does not generally prevent plaintiffs from suing third parties.
while the debtor-corporation may be immune from nonbankruptcy related
litigation, its insiders,'3 9 as third-party nondebtors,40can be held liable for tort
Even if such suits are
damages in suits brought directly against them.
and court costs.
fees
attorneys'
for
pay
to
have
will
insiders
unsuccessful,
An uncontroversial method of limiting or covering the personal liability
of insiders is for the debtor to purchase a D&O Policy naming the insiders as
beneficiaries. This type of insurance coverage not only insures the insiders
against possible claims for damages, but also against the litigation expenses
4
associated with defending suits.' ' From a plaintiff's perspective, these D&O
Policies are attractive sources of payment for a judgment because they appear
to represent funds in the hands of a solvent third party rather than in the hands
of a potentially insolvent debtor.
Additionally, D&O Policies often insure the debtor-corporation against
any claim for indemnification brought by an insider ("Indemnity
Coverage").' 4 2 Generally, D&O Policies consist of a combination of three

138. Section 362(a) stays any actions by a party against the debtor taken to acquire
property of the bankruptcy estate. In relevant part, § 362(a) states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,302,
or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of ajudicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding againstthe debtorthat
was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title,
or to recover a claim againstthe debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(2) the enforcement, againstthe debtoror againstpropertyof the estate, of a judgment
obtained before the commencement of the case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (emphasis added). However, this stay only protects the debtor from the
commencement or initiation of suits; the plain language of § 362 affords no protection for
related nondebtors. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Namrod Dev. Corp., 140 B.R. 56, 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61, 65 (2d
Cir. 1986); GAF Corp. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 405,414
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
139. "Insider" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(31(B)-(C)) to include directors, officers,
general partners, and others that control or are responsible for the acts of incorporeal entities
such as corporations and partnerships. In other words, insiders are likely to be the codefendants
of the debtor in tort suits.
140. For example, plaintiffs may recover from insiders directly under federal securities
laws, imposing personal liability on the directors and officers of publicly traded corporations,
or under state common-law fraud.
141. See, e.g., Adelphia Communications Corp. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd.
(In re Adelphia Communications Corp.), 285 B.R. 580, 586-89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(concerning an insurance policy that covered both losses and the costs of litigation incurred by
its insider-beneficiaries, but had exceptions for intentional or criminal conduct).
142. Many state corporation laws and corporation charters require corporations to
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distinct types of insurance coverage: (i) insurance against claims brought by
plaintiffs directly against the debtor's directors and officers ("Liability
Coverage"); 43 (ii) insurance against claims for indemnification brought by
directors and officers against the debtor-corporation ("Indemnity
Coverage");' and (iii) insurance against securities laws claims brought by
plaintiffs directly against the debtor-corporation ("Entity Coverage").' 4
Although a corporation owns the D&O Policy, the main purpose of the policy
is to insure insiders against personal liability arising from their employment
with the corporation--even when the corporation is a named beneficiary under
the policy. 46
1. Pre-petition D&O Policies
In many cases, corporations purchase D&O Policies for their insiders
outside bankruptcy-long before the company ever anticipates filing a Chapter
11 petition. As long as the corporation remains current with its premiums and
other obligations, these policies become property of the estate. 47 However,

indemnify their directors and officers. D&O Policies covering a corporation for indemnity
claims ensure that the corporation will be able to satisfy these obligations.
143. See, e.g., La. World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition,
Inc.), 832 F.2d 1391, 1398-99 (5th Cir. 1987) (concerning a D&O Policy containing Liability
and Indemnity Coverage, but considering the rights of the parties based solely on the Liability
Coverage); cf. Houston v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1993)
(examining the rights of parties under a medical malpractice insurance policy in which the sole
beneficiaries were injured patients).
144. See, e.g., Executive Risk Indem., Inc. v. Boston Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., (In re Boston
Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc.), 285 B.R. 87,88-89 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (concerning a D&O Policy
containing both Liability and Indemnity Coverage); Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n v.
Ventresco (In re Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n), 271 B.R. 544, 546-47 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2002).
145. See, e.g., Adelphia Communications, 285 B.R. at 586 (concerning a D&O Policy
containing Liability, Indemnity, and Entity Coverage); In re Cybermedica, Inc. 280 B.R. 12,
14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002); Ochs v. Lipson (In re First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 238 B.R. 9, 14 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1999); Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K Corp.), 121 B.R. 257, 260-61 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1990).
146. See La. World Exposition, 832 F.2d at 1398-99; Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp.
Ass'n, 271 B.R. at 550; First Cent. Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 16-17. But see Adelphia
Communications, 285 B.R. at 597-99 (recognizing that a debtor-corporation named under a
D&O Policy may also have an interest in the proceeds).
147. "Because corporations pay for and own insurance policies, courts considering the
question have concluded that the policies are property of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(I)." FirstCent. Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 15-16 (citing A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788
F.2d 994, 1001 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Under the weight of authority, insurance contracts have been
said to be embraced in this statutory definition of 'property.'")); accord MacArthur Co. v.
Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1988); La. World
Exposition, 832 F.2d at 1399; Minoco Group ofCos. v. First State Underwriters Agency of New
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the proceeds of a D&O Policy generally do not become property of the estate
because the debtor is not the named beneficiary under the policy and, thus, has
no rights to the proceeds. As a result, they are available to satisfy the claims
of tort victims asserted against the debtor's insiders.
The debtor owns any policy it purchased pre-petition; however, the debtor
owns the proceeds of a D&O Policy only if the debtor is a named
Although the debtor-corporation is technically a named
beneficiary.'
beneficiary under a D&O Policy containing Indemnity Coverage, a majority
of courts have found that the proceeds of these policies are not included in the
debtor's estate and, thus, are available to satisfy the claims of tort victims
against insiders.' 4 9 These courts reason that D&O Policies are different than
ordinary liability insurance policies because, although the corporation
purchases the policy, the insiders are the intended beneficiaries and ultimate
recipients of the proceeds. 50
In recent years, some corporations have purchased D&O5 Policies that also
provide Entity Coverage for violations of securities laws. ' The purpose of
of
insuring the corporation along with its insiders is to avoid allocation
52
corporations.'
and
liability battles between insurance companies
Entity coverage developed in response to difficult "allocation of loss" fights
between insureds and insurers when securities claims were asserted against
both insureds (directors and officers) and non-insureds (corporations) in the
same suit (as well as covered and uncovered claims). Disputes ensued over
allocating both litigation expenses and settlements or judgments between
insured and uninsured co-defendants. In apportioning settlement orjudgment
responsibility, insurers claimed that a large portion of the total loss should be
allocated to the corporation itself and, therefore, uninsured. Conversely,
loss should be allocated to the directors
corporations argued that most of the 53
and officers and, therefore, insured.'
England Reinsurance Corp. (In re Minoco Group of Cos.), 799 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1986);
In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 184 (5th Cir. 1984); Adelphia Communications, 285 B.R. at 591;
Cybermedica, 280 B.R. at 16; Youngstown OsteopathicHosp. Ass 'n, 271 B.R. at 551.
148. See cases cited supra note 147.
149. See, e.g., Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 271 B.R. at 550-51 ("'Unlike an
ordinary liability insurance policy, in which a corporate purchaser obtains primary protection
from lawsuits, a corporation does not enjoy direct coverage under a D & 0 policy.'" (quoting
FirstCent. Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 16)). But see Boston Reg' Med. Ctr., 285 B.R. at 92 & n.5
(stating that a debtor, who is the named beneficiary of Indemnity Coverage under a D&O
Policy, has an interest in the proceeds that is distinct from that of the insiders).
150.

See, e.g., Youngstown OsteopathicHosp. Ass 'n, 271 B.R. at 550.

151. Nan Roberts Eitel, Now You Have It, Now You Don't: Directors' and Officers'
InsuranceAfter a CorporateBankruptcy, 46 LoY. L. REv. 585, 588-89 (2000) ("The addition

of entity coverage is a relatively recent phenomenon in the D&O insurance market arising in
the last five to six years.").
152. Id. at 589.
153. Id. (footnotes omitted).

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 71:81

Once the corporation is added to the policy, the insurer no longer can point its
finger at the company, hoping to decrease the amount it must pay to the
insiders under a D&O Policy.5 4 Because the debtor has a property interest in
the proceeds, that interest is included in the debtor's bankruptcy estate (i.e., the
debtor possesses a contingent interest in receiving the policy proceeds).' 5 5
Thus, any nondebtor beneficiary of the policy must request that the bankruptcy
court grant relief from the automatic stay to access the proceeds.' 56 In many
cases, however, bankruptcy courts have granted either total or limited relief
from the stay to co-beneficiary insiders wishing to access D&O Policy
proceeds. 7
Generally, insiders will be able to access the D&O Policy's proceeds
should a plaintiff bring suit (if the suit is covered under the terms of the
policy) against the insiders.'
Thus, provided that tort victims can

154. See id. ("By insuring the corporation itself, the industry sought to avoid... allocation
disputes."). As a result, however, some bankruptcy courts have determined that Entity
Coverage causes the debtor-corporation to possess a property interest in the proceeds. See, e.g.,
Adelphia Communications Corp. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd. (In re Adelphia
Communications Corp.), 285 B.R. 580, 593 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Cybermedica, Inc.
280 B.R. 12, 17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002); Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K Corp.), 121
B.R. 257, 261 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990); see also Eitel, supra note 151, at 590 ("[T]here is a
strong possibility that in the event of corporate bankruptcy, some or all of the policy proceeds
will be deemed estate property. Ifso, the directors and officers could look only to the insolvent
corporation for indemnification, and their claims, if allowed, would likely be
subordinated .. ");
cf FirstCent. Fin. Corp., 238 B.R. at 17-18 (holding that proceeds of a
D&O Policy were not property of the estate under its specific set of facts, but suggesting that
proceeds of a policy containing Entity Coverage may be property of the estate).
155. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000) ("[The] estate is comprised of... all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."); see also
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1983) (stating that property of the
estate as defined under § 541(a)(1) is intended to be construed broadly); Affiliated Computer
Sys. v. Sherman (In re Kemp), 52 F.3d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The conditional, future,
speculative, or equitable nature of an interest does not prevent it from being property of the
bankruptcy estate.").
156. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (placing an automatic stay over "any act to obtain
possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over
property of the estate"), with § 362(d)(1) (stating that, after notice and a hearing, a court shall
grant relief from a stay if a party in interest has shown "cause, including the lack of adequate
protection of an interest in property of such party in interest").
157. See, e.g., Adelphia Communications, 285 B.R. at 599-600 (ordering limited relief
from the automatic stay, thereby allowing insiders to access the D&O Policy proceeds up to a
certain amount); Cybermedica,280 B.R. at 20 (granting the insiders' motion for relief from the
stay to use the proceeds for reasonable litigation expenses).
158. The insiders need not seek relief from a stay under § 362(a) to access insurance
proceeds of the typical D&O Policy--even if the policy should contain Indemnity Coverage.
But see Houston v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51,56 n.21 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Once
a court has determined that an insurance policy is property of the estate, 11 U.S.C. §362 should
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successfully assert their claims against the insiders, these victims will have a
source of repayment other than the personal assets of the insiders.
Consequently, insider access ensures that the interests of both the tort victims
and the insiders are protected, as the proceeds will not be distributed pro rata
as property of the debtor's estate.
2. Postpetition D&O Policies
A debtor also may elect to purchase a D&O Policy after the petition date.
If so, the premiums paid by the estate to the insurer would be an administrative
expense as one of the "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
59
estate... rendered after the commencement of the case."' Like a pre-petition
D&O Policy, a postpetition D&O Policy is also property of the debtor's
estate. 60 However, insiders named as beneficiaries under postpetition D&O
Policies may access the proceeds directly without petitioning the bankruptcy
court for relief from the automatic stay, regardless of whether the debtor is
named as a co-beneficiary under the policy.' 6 ' Nonetheless, a corporate debtor
may have difficulty acquiring a new D&O Policy or may be forced to pay
62
premiums well over the market rate because of its financial situation.'
Further, in the tort setting, postpetition policies are unlikely to provide
coverage for pre-petition injuries, making them of little interest to tort victims,
except to fund payments on postpetition claims.

stay any injured party from suing or recovering from the debtor's insurer."); Executive Risk
Indem., Inc. v. Boston Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. (In re Boston Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc.), 285 B.R. 87,
91-92, 94 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (requiring insiders to obtain relief from the stay because the
debtor had a property interest in the proceeds by virtue of the Indemnity Coverage contained
in the D&O Policy). However, if the D&O Policy contains Entity Coverage, the insiders most
likely must request that the bankruptcy court grant relief from the automatic stay because the
debtor has an interest in the policy proceeds. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
159. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).
160. See II U.S.C. § 541(a)(7).
161. Section 541(a) states that property of the estate includes only the debtor's interests
in property. Thus, the § 362(a) automatic stay does not apply to the proceeds of a D&O Policy
acquired postpetition until the debtor has an interest in those proceeds. Cf Ochs v. Lipson (In
re First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 238 B.R. 9, 21-22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that co-insured
insiders may access the proceeds ofa D&O Policy acquired pre-petition without petitioning the
bankruptcy court for relief from the stay because the debtor had no interest in the proceeds
absent the presence of a claim against the debtor).
162. See, e.g., Adelphia Communications, 285 B.R. at 592 (noting that one of the debtors
in that case was unable to purchase a new D&O Policy); see also Jon D. Schneider, D&O
Insurance: Will It Be Available After a Chapter 11 Filing?, at 3-4 (Dec. 11, 2002)
(discussing the application process for acquiring a D&O policy), at
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/publications/ins-schneider_12 11 02.pdf.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Tort damages (and whether or not they are collected) can thus be impacted
by bankruptcy on a variety of levels and in a number of ways. The savvy tort
lawyer will understand the potential for defendants to use the Bankruptcy
Code to avoid or delay payment of the tort claim and will incorporate this
understanding into her evaluation and strategy of the case and any potential
settlement.

